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EMPLOYMENT AND DECENT WORK IN 
THE ERA OF FLEXICURITY 
Robert Boyer 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that the dynamism of employment is always 
contradictory to the enforcement of some forms of security for workers. Contemporary 
theorizing now recognizes the specificity of the wage-labour nexus. Consequently, minimum 
security is required for good economic performance by firms and national economies. A 
comparative analysis of OECD countries shows that the extended security promoted by welfare 
systems has not been detrimental to innovation, growth and job creation. Developing countries 
cannot immediately catch up with the emerging standards of flexicurity but the methodology of 
employment diagnosis might help them in designing security/flexibility configurations tailored 
according to their domestic economic specialization, social values and political choices. 
 
EMPLOI ET SÉCURITÉ À L’ÈRE DU 
MODÈLE DANOIS 
Robert Boyer 
 
Résumé 
 
Le papier discute la vision traditionnelle en vertu de laquelle la mise en uvre dune forme ou 
une autre de sécurité des travailleurs est partout et toujours défavorable au dynamisme de 
lemploi. Les nouvelles théories du travail reconnaissent la spécificité du rapport salarial, de sorte 
quun degré minimum de sécurité savère nécessaire pour garantir lefficacité tant des entreprises 
que des économies nationales.  Une comparaison des pays de lOCDE montre quune sécurité 
étendue grâce à des systèmes de couverture sociale est loin davoir été défavorable à linnovation, 
la croissance et la création demplois. Les pays en voie de développement ne peuvent pas 
rattraper immédiatement les normes implicites à la flexicurité danoise mais la méthodologie du 
diagnostic des facteurs qui limitent lemploi peut être très utile pour expliciter la configuration des 
sécurités et flexibilités qui répond à la spécialisation économique, les valeurs et les choix 
politiques propres à chaque pays. 
  
JEL Classification:  J23, J31, J48, J83, O15 
 
Keywords: Workers security, Labour flexibility, Decent work, Developing countries, Labour 
standards, Employment diagnosis, Productive employment, Welfare, flexicurity 
 
Mots clés: Sécurité des travailleurs, flexibilité du travail, économie en développement, normes 
internationales de travail, diagnostic demploi, couverture sociale, flexicurité. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The current concern about development with decent work has to be appraised in historical 
retrospect. Back in the 1960s, the so-called Golden Age for developed countries, the 
institutionalization of workers rights and the constitution of an extended welfare state proved to 
be compatible with a fast and rather stable growth. At that time, dynamic efficiency and social 
justice were more frequently perceived as complementary rather than contradictory.  
 
Since the 1970s, however, the slowdown of growth and the emergence of mass  
employment have put into question this virtuous configuration. What was thought of as an asset 
has turned out to be viewed as a liability. In this context, experts have convinced many 
Governments that most, if not all, labour-market institutions had to be reformed because they 
generated various rigidities detrimental to job creation and innovation. The strategies of 
flexibilization of labour markets have been generalized and concern not only wage formation, 
employment legislation and welfare, but also work organization. During this second epoch, most 
analysts have perceived a trade-off between economic efficiency and social justice.  
 
The pressure to reform labour contracts and welfare in developed countries has been 
reinforced by the process of globalization: multinational corporations have delocalized significant 
segments of the value chain towards emerging countries, especially in Asia. These countries were 
supposed to enjoy a definite competitive edge, associated with low wages, high labour-market 
flexibility and, for some of them, fast growth of their domestic markets. Consequently, the 
relative decline of old industrialized countries was partially attributed to the rigidity of their 
labour-market institutions, whereas the surge of emerging countries benefited from highly 
flexible labour markets. Thus, during the 1990s, more and more worker security-enhancing 
devices have been perceived as detrimental to job creation, growth and innovation. 
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The core message of this paper is that this period might be over, for at least three main 
reasons. First, the old labour-market theory, based on symmetric information, has been replaced 
by more realistic hypotheses that take into account the specificity of the capital-labour nexus, 
which is both a market contract and a subordinate relationship.  Therefore, low wages and poor 
working conditions are no more an optimum for firms, given the endogeneity of work intensity, 
commitment and productivity. For instance, a fair labour contract that warrants a form of 
security  employment stability, access to unemployment benefits, right to training and further 
education  might be superior both for firms and individuals compared with a typical competitive 
adjustment of wages to the ongoing equilibrium value. The paper proposes to detect the various 
mechanisms according to which security-enhancing welfare may improve simultaneously the 
financial performance of a firm and the welfare of the workers. 
 
A second line of argument builds upon the results of various comparative analyses of the 
performance of the member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) during the last decade. Whereas the countries that had more fully 
deregulated their labour market were supposed to be the best performers in terms of job 
creation, innovation and growth, a surprising finding focuses upon the quite remarkable 
configuration of small social democratic economies (Finland, Denmark and Sweden). Generous 
income security is associated with the wide freedom granted to firms concerning employment 
decisions. This exchange of a form of security against the capacity for adjustment is part of a 
compromise that delivers very good macroeconomic outcomes. Similar to the Golden Age, the 
security of workers is no longer in contradiction with the flexibility of firms. This flexicurity 
model is an alternative to the flex-flexibility, typical workfare based upon an absolute search for 
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flexibility in all the components of the labour contract (employment, hours, wages, social 
benefits, unemployment compensation, skills and competence, etc.). 
 
A last reason is specific to developing countries. A decade ago, the implementation of the 
Washington Consensus was supposed to promote high-speed growth, near full-employment and 
the progressive eradication of poverty. Nowadays, it is clear that the link between fast growth and 
the subsequent improvement in labour standards is far from mechanical. Of course, the poverty 
rate has been significantly reduced in large countries such as China and India, but it is not a 
widely observed phenomenon. Furthermore, a new branch of development theory stresses that 
basic rights might well be a precondition for successful growth strategies, and not only the long-
term automatic outcome of economic reforms in the direction of efficiency. Similarly, empirical 
investigations recurrently show that low wages and poor working conditions are not necessarily 
the key factors governing the localization of multinationals. Consequently, the crucial issue might 
be expressed in the following manner: what kind of workers security could benefit development, 
and how could the required securities be implemented. 
 
The paper builds upon these three lines of analysis in order to detect how the reactivity to 
macroeconomic shocks, globalization and technical change can be made compatible with the 
implementation of some securities for the workers of developing countries. 
CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC THEORIES:  A REAPPRAISAL OF THE 
LABOUR FLEXIBILITY/SECURITY DEBATE 
The issue of decent work, and more generally workers security, is closely linked to the 
broader question of the function and the impact of the welfare state. Actually, the literature on 
the welfare state is split along clear dividing lines. On one side, the theoreticians, especially the 
economists, tend to refer to a perfectly organized society, with full information and insurance, 
and compare this ideal with existing welfare states, which of course are highly imperfect. 
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Consequently, there is a strong temptation to assert that the existing welfare state is the main 
cause of unemployment, poverty and social exclusion that should not exist in the pure theory of a 
market economy governed by democratic principles. On the other side, the specialists of the 
domain do analyse carefully the inner working of each system, the diversity of the strategies of 
the actors involved and, finally, the variety of organizations observed all over the world with no 
clear nor absolute superiority of any single configuration. Roughly speaking, each society finally 
inherits a welfare state that is coherent with its system of values, political organization and 
economic specialization. 
 
Actually, few frameworks take into account both the theoretical and empirical size of a 
welfare system and analyse the long-run impact of social security. By chance, the renewed interest 
for growth theory and the recent concern for institutional analysis entitles a third way, that this 
paper tries to follow.     
The inadequacy of a pure, competitive model in assessing the 
impact of a security-enhancing welfare state 
 
After World War II, the issue of social security used to be analysed within a 
macroeconomic framework, put forward by the Keynesian breakthrough: in a sense, the 
Beveridge Plan was conceived as a complement to a full-employment programme. Nowadays, the 
intellectual scheme governing economic policy decisions is strongly embedded into a 
microeconomic analysis of the rational choice of agents facing a system of prices, incentives and 
uncertainties (Council of Economic Advisers, 1998). Thus, implicitly at least, Partial or General 
Equilibrium Theory is frequently used to assess the impact of the social benefits and collective 
coverage of risk typical of welfare. If one adopts the old microeconomic theory, where 
information is perfect and no externality prevails, then ineluctably any welfare system will 
introduce a distortion departing from a pure and perfect competitive equilibrium that is 
simultaneously a Pareto optimum. This is specially so if one considers some form of collective 
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control over employment or collective coverage of individual risk. Under this framework, any 
welfare measure is always costly in terms of economic efficiency: this trade-off should be 
arbitrated by the democratic system, but the economist is clearly on the side of efficiency and 
efficacy (figure 1). 
Figure 1  Why the competitive equilibrium theory is not suited for assessing the impact of the 
security brought by welfare systems 
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The market view: security introduces a distance with respect to the general equilibrium 
that is a Pareto optimum. 
 
 The institutionalist view: 
• Full security may contradict the requirements of a capitalist economy. 
• No security at all may create instability in labour contracts and industrial relations. 
• In between, some security may be optimum for economic performance as well as for 
welfare. 
 
 
 
Such an approach is largely unsatisfactory and in some instances erroneous. First of all, 
modern economic theory does not confirm the generality of the convergence of a tâtonnement 
process toward equilibrium. It has been argued convincingly that the two welfare theorems 
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actually relate to a perfectly planned economy and not at all to a fully decentralized market 
economy (Benassy, 1982). If, then, information is made imperfect and the economy is subjected 
to stochastic disturbances, it has been proved that a fully rational economic agent who would 
react instantaneously to the price signals exhibited by the market would be worse off than a 
prudent agent who had adjusted his strategy smoothly (Heiner, 1988). Of course, not adjusting at 
all would lead quasi certainly to the bankruptcy of the agent: the maximum speed of adjustment is 
not optimum any more. This is a first and quite general rationale for the inverse U-shaped 
performance curve of figure 1. 
 
Many other models suggest a similar result about the optimality of an intermediate level of 
adjustment and of flexibility. For instance, a very simple multi-sector model describing income 
distribution and effective demand formation shows that the same inverse U-shaped curve is 
observed with respect to the speed of adjustment of employment to its (neo-classical) efficient 
level (Boyer, Mistral 1982). The reason is simple: what is gained at the micro level in terms of 
productive efficiency can be lost at the aggregate level by a negative impact upon effective 
demand. More general models inspired by modern classical theory put forward the role of the 
correction of various disequilibria (on the product market via inventories, on the labour market 
via hiring, and on the financial market via investment) in the convergence, respectively, towards a 
short-, medium- and, finally, long-term equilibrium. Nevertheless, if the speed of reaction of the 
firms is too high, one observes a bifurcation point generating two equilibria. In between, there is 
the equivalent of a crisis, in the sense of a brusque shift from one equilibrium to another 
(Dumenil, Lévy, 1993). Again, the maximum speed of adjustment is adverse to the economic 
performance and even to the existence of a market equilibrium. Such a property is finally very 
general and concerns too financial markets themselves: up to a threshold, too fast capital mobility 
in reaction to profit rate differentials may propitiate a period of fast growth and then an abrupt 
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crisis. This pattern is explained by the lack of productive diversity to cope with new types of 
disturbances or stochastic shocks (Eliasson, 1984). 
 
A more specific analysis suggests that there generally exists an inverted U-shaped relation 
between the degree of security and long-term economic performance (Altman and others, 2006). 
First, a basic level of security allows individuals to take risks, for instance, to invest in education, 
launch a business or try new methods or imagine new products, all actions that are at the origin 
of growth. Second, the existence of a safety net mitigates the adverse effects of hardship because 
the assistance in terms of finance, education or training helps in overcoming the temporary 
setbacks that go along with a constantly evolving economy. A third benefit of a modicum of 
security is especially important during a period of globalization and fast technical change: an 
adequate level may lessen the demand for protectionism and Malthusian policies that would 
hamper growth. The very process of creative destruction calls for some form of security for the 
industries and jobs adversely affected by the restructuring of the economy. 
 
 Thus, neither total insecurity nor complete security is good for long-term growth.  
Consequently, the issue is to find out what the optimum degree and form of security should be, 
given the parameters of each economy. There is no rationale for seeking maximum flexibility and, 
conversely, a significant reactivity in the labour market is not necessarily in contradiction with 
decent work, defined as the right to basic security. These general results are especially important 
for the assessment of welfare systems because they basically deliver a form of insurance and a 
smoothing of adverse events. From a theoretical point of view they may (or may not  but this is 
an empirical issue) contribute to macroeconomic performance. 
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The need to take into account the externalities associated with 
various forms of security 
 
The previous reasoning was questioning the hypothesis of full information in an uncertain 
world and was claiming that a form of insurance and smoothing of disturbances might improve 
macroeconomic performance. But there is a second justification for extended welfare and public 
intervention, i.e., the existence of positive or negative externalities that cannot be internalized via 
private insurance or incentives directed towards the private sector (WHO, 2000: 55). The 
argument can be developed, made more specific and can closely conform to the various forms of 
security analysed by the Socio-economic Security Programme (ILO, 2004b) (figure 2).  
 
• Traditionally, public authorities may promote income security in reaction to the adverse 
outcome of pure market logic upon poverty and social inequalities. One form of this security 
is the imposition by law of a minimum wage. For this intervention to be effective and 
binding, conventional micro theory concludes that the less-paid workers will be priced out of 
the market, provoking then unemployment. It is, however, only a partial-equilibrium result 
since such a measure has a global impact upon the total wage bill, hence the level of effective 
demand. Have recent careful studies not concluded that the recent hikes in the American 
minimum wage have finally benefited employment, contrary to the expectation of a typical 
neo-classical analysis? This short, medium-term impact might be completed in the long run 
by the incentive that the absence of a downward flexibility of wage exerts upon the direction 
and intensity of labour-saving innovations. On aggregate, the impact might be positive -- and 
has actually been during the Golden Age (Boyer, 2000). 
 
• A second form of income security, the unemployment insurance system, has also some 
impact upon the speed of adoption of technological and organizational change. Whereas 
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most of the analysts focus upon the negative side of the social contribution associated with 
the payment of unemployment benefits, i.e., less employment, a medium long-term view 
introduces a positive factor: when workers are sure to be somehow compensated for the job 
destruction associated with technical change, the related restructuring is more easily accepted. 
Some European comparisons made during the early 1980s, confirm this (Boyer, 1988). 
Conversely, when such compensation is absent (in contemporary Russia, for instance 
(Touffut, 1999)), the benefits from technical change are not clearly perceived by the workers, 
who tend to protect the existing technologies, closely associated with the conservation of 
their jobs. Thus macro solidarity is better than micro egoism for the diffusion of innovations. 
 
• Voice-representation security is present when, for instance, collective rights are granted to 
unions for representing workers; negotiating with firms may have the same dual impact. On 
one side, a form of oligopolistic power is thus introduced into the functioning of the labour 
market that may create a negative effect upon the level of employment in compensation for 
the higher wage. On the other side, the voice given to representatives of the workers may 
enhance commitment, and the ability to introduce new technologies or redesign the 
organization of the firm to the mutual benefit of the entrepreneurs and the workers 
(Freeman, Medoff, 1984). The German and Japanese configurations of the 1980s gave a good 
image of this kind of complementarity, between social rights and economic performance 
linked to the quality of product or the high productivity in the production of standardized 
goods, brought by good industrial relations. 
 
• Life security is a still another component of workers security. It can be extended from 
accident and illness at work to health care in general. Now, more and more, some 
theoreticians of economic development (Chenery and Srinivasan, 1988, Todaro and 
Smith, 2005) admit that the level of health is an important factor in the quality and size 
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of the labour supply and, by extension, in the productivity of workers. Even for 
developed countries, the welfare gains associated with the extension of life expectation 
and the reduction of morbidity may have overtaken gains as they are measured by 
conventional national accounting methods (Foundation Albert and Mary Lasker, 2000). 
It is well known that significant externalities are operating within the health-care sector 
(the fight against infectious diseases, increasing returns to scale associated with vaccines, 
pharmaceutical research, etc.). Clearly, at the world level, the role of the welfare state in 
the provision of an adequate level of health care is more essential than ever (WHO, 
2000). 
 
• In the same spirit, skill security is a fourth component. Along with basic education, 
permanent competence building is more and more recognized as a key factor in endogenous 
technical change (Lucas, 1988; 1993) and in social stratification (Bénabou, 1996). The 
externalities are multifaceted:  the educational system delivers the higher competence of 
workers, who develop the ability to learn along the whole spectrum of the life cycle; it also 
detects and trains the innovators, who are able to invent new products and processes, etc.  All 
these gains cannot be internalized by market mechanisms, and it is why many educational 
systems are public or subsidized and that a minimum level of education is generally 
compulsory. Thus, even if education is not formally included in the strict definition of a 
welfare state, it is important to address this issue, and is quite relevant to the discussion of the 
role of public interventions in the contemporary world. 
According to this framework, based on a realistic appraisal of information problems 
and externalities in decentralized economies, the achievement of more social justice is not 
always detrimental to economic efficiency. In some special cases, a synergy could emerge 
between a well-designed welfare state and the dynamism of innovations. A very simple model  
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Figure 2  How various securities may enhance dynamic efficiency 
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can be sketched to capture the core of the argument (figure 3). Let us imagine that a tax is levied to 
finance a society-wide training system: two distinct effects would then be operating and should be 
considered simultaneously. 
 
• Of course, the related tax has to be paid, for instance by firms, and therefore their demand for 
labour would shift adversely, in such a manner that in the short term the equilibrium real wage 
would be lower, thereby inducing a shift from employment to leisure. Frequently, the reasoning 
stops here and analysts conclude that the measure is finally counterproductive: a society without a 
welfare state would deliver better welfare for its citizens, which is quite a paradox. 
 
• The social tax, however, is not only a cost since it delivers a benefit and is supposed to contribute, 
for instance, to the financing of more education and training. Therefore, the productivity of the 
labour force is higher than it would be within an economy devoid of such a welfare system. 
Consequently, productive employment is lower but the proportion of the population that is on 
training increases at the long-term equilibrium. Within an endogenous technical change model, total 
factor productivity increases are linearly linked to the stock of human capital. If so, the steady-
growth path is higher than before and this ultimately compensates for the lost productive output 
during the first phase of implementation of the measure. Therefore, for a sufficiently low-
actualization rate, the economy finally benefits from the collective financing of more training and 
education. 
 
To sum up, the contribution to social security may affect negatively the short-run equilibrium but 
may induce decisions and investments that promote innovations and growth. Such a framework, even 
if relatively simple, allows a rigorous assessment of the pros and cons of any component of the welfare 
state, without concluding ex ante that it is always detrimental (this is the quasi general conclusion from 
typical neo-classical research) or always good (that is sometimes the propensity of the defenders of  
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Figure 3 - A reconciliation of two opposed visions of the impact of welfare 
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existing welfare states). Consequently, the assessment of contemporary welfare states is not a 
purely theoretical issue but, above all, a matter of careful empirical studies (Atkinson, 1999; 
Tachibanaki, 2000; Tachibanaki, Fujiki and Nakada, 2000). This analytical framework is relevant 
for developing countries as well. For instance, the Asian financial crises and the related structural 
reforms have made quite central the issue of the possible complementarity between the building 
of an inclusive welfare state and a long-term development strategy (Kwon, 2006). 
 
SOME LABOUR SECURITIES PROMOTE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE  
It is out of the scope of the present paper to provide an assessment of some of the labour 
securities that promote economic performance. The papers objective is far more modest: to 
deliver a brief survey of the literature according to this vision of the welfare state.  Let us provide 
rudimentary evidence of the inadequacy of the conventional vision that puts forward only the 
costs and not the benefits of workers security. 
Job security helps workforce redeployment 
The core argument in favour of typical labour-market flexibility is two-fold. On one side, in 
response to economic and technological shocks, the labour force has to be shifted from one firm 
to another and across sectors. Such a move warrants static efficiency that is privileged by partial 
or general equilibrium analyses. On the other side, when technological change is speeding          
up -- especially if an old, productive paradigm is decaying and a new, quite different, one is 
emerging -- an intensive shift of workers has to take place from the mature to the sunrise 
industries. The question is why workers should accept these structural changes. The reason would 
be  only if their ex post long-term welfare could be improved, and if the transition costs were 
reduced by an adequate public redistribution of the benefits associated with productive increases 
and product differentiation. 
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 An international comparison suggests that job security is quite beneficial to the acceptance 
of change and the move from bad to good jobs (figure 4). Of course, the relationship is not that 
simple. On the one hand, Ireland, Netherlands and Denmark do combine job security and very 
high transition rates from obsolete to emerging jobs. On the other hand, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland defines a second configuration whereby a high level of 
insecurity induces significant mobility. This is an important caveat for any temptation to single 
out one particular best-way model. Institutional economics explain why: there exist different 
complementarities between the nature of competition, the organization of the labour market, the 
generosity of the welfare, and the direction and intensity of innovation (Aoki, 2001; Amable, 
2003). 
Figure 4  Quality of job prospects and insecurity, selected European countries, 1995-2000 
(percentage) 
 
Source: ILO (2004a), p. 206. 
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Labour-market policies can reduce job insecurity 
 
Left alone, the functioning of highly competitive labour markets does not provide the job 
security that workers expect, for various reasons. First, modern labour-market theory suggests 
that full employment is the exception and the equilibrium with unemployment or scarcity of 
workers is the rule. One of the objectives of macroeconomic policy is precisely to maintain the 
economy close to quasi full employment, but the task has become more and more difficult, 
especially in Europe. Second, in case of unemployment, the access to employment can be 
restricted to the most skilled and productive workers, leaving the less privileged in long-term 
unemployment. It is why active labour-market policies have to be designed and implemented. 
 
 Precise, empirical analyses among OECD countries confirm the existence of a significant 
correlation between job insecurity and the poor spending on employment policies (figure 5). 
Again, among the star performers in terms of security, one finds the same countries as for     
figure 4: Netherlands, Ireland and Denmark. At the opposite end, the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America, as well as the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Japan, are 
characterized by a low degree of intervention in the functioning of the labour markets and quite 
high job insecurity. 
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Figure 5  Job insecurity and spending on labour market policies, selected OECD countries, 2000 
 
 
Source: ILO (2004a), p. 207. 
 
 
Small, open economies have more active employment policies 
Conventional economic theories generally suggest that small and very open economies 
need greater flexibility than medium-sized or large countries. Basically, they should be            
price takers, and thus unable to finance the extra costs associated with a generous welfare state 
promoting workers security. This stylized fact is not at all confirmed by international 
comparisons among OECD countries. At one extreme, large and not so open economies, such as 
the US and Japan, do not spend large amounts for employment policies. At the other extreme, 
Finland, Sweden, Netherlands and Belgium combine a large openness to world trade with a major 
influence on labour-market policies (figure 6).  
 
Political economists provide a quite appealing interpretation of this situation. When the 
welfare of citizens is highly dependent on successful integration in the international division of 
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labour, simultaneously some major risks do occur due to the fast and frequently unexpected 
variations in the demand, exchange rate and price in the international economy. Therefore, 
according to a long historical process, these small, open economies have found that extensive 
welfare and redistributive tax systems are the permissive conditions for the acceptance by 
workers of international competition and the related uncertainty. Of course, this is not at all a 
functionalist or mechanical process, since social movements and politicians have to convert these 
pressures into acceptable compromises between labour and capital (Katzenstein, 1985). These 
findings are both a hope and a challenge for developing countries: on the one hand, their opening 
to the world economy might be associated with new risks that call for the design of solidarity 
procedures to share the benefits of the winners with the losers; on the other hand, the design and 
implementation of adequate labour laws and welfare benefits are quite difficult tasks, especially 
for politically unstable countries that have poor institutional capacity. 
Figure 6  Spending on labour-market policies (LMP) increases with openness: selected 
industrialized countries, 1970-2000 
 
Source: ILO (2004a),  p. 190. 
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Active welfare may be complementary to innovation policy 
One could expect that the economies with the most intensive redistribution via welfare 
should be lagging in terms of macroeconomic performance. On the contrary, it is surprising to 
find out that the countries with the leaner welfare benefits are not necessarily at the forefront of 
technological innovation and that most of the small, open economies with extensive welfare have 
been faring quite well during the last decade (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, etc.), with total factor 
productivity increases rivaling the so-admired American New Economy (figure 7). The recent 
research, carried out under the aegis of OECD to explain why growth rates differed so much 
during the 1990s, has shown that these European economies are already operating under the 
virtuous circle that is assumed to be typical of a Knowledge-Based Economy (KBE) (Bassanini, 
Scarpetta and Visco, 2000; OECD, 1999; Guellec, 2000). 
Figure 7  Change in multi-factor productivity (MFP) growth and change in business research 
and development (R&D) intensity 
Source: Bassanini A., Scarpetta S. and Visco I. (2000: 27) 
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A whole spectrum of configuration for workers’ security 
Thus, international comparisons falsify the conventional hypothesis of a single best way for 
the organization of welfare. A priori, one should observe a very large variety of ways, combining 
income security, voice-representation security, life security and skill security. Actually, the existing 
configurations are less diverse, probably due to the existence of complementarity as well as some 
major incompatibilities between these various forms (table 1).  
Table 1  Employment or employability protection? A typology of OECD countries during the 
late 1990s and early 2000s 
 
Source: ILO (2004a), p. 209. 
 
Basically, for developed countries, two major tools have been used in reaction to workers 
demands and the nature of insecurity. On the one hand, some Governments might be tempted to 
protect existing jobs, and this is employment security stricto sensu. Typically, Mediterranean 
European countries belong to this model. On the other hand, social partners might prefer to 
accept intensive job destruction and creation in return for a safety net that provides high income 
security for the displaced workers in response to competition, technical change or crisis. Again, 
the small, open economies previously mentioned, Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands, Finland and 
Ireland, belong to this configuration. Two composite cases exist. A third group, composed of the 
US and the United Kingdom, simultaneously exhibits low social protection and very weak 
employment protection. A hybrid configuration combines both high social coverage and 
employment protection: France, Germany and Sweden. 
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Thus, this brief survey of the links between labour-market flexibility and workers security 
in OECD countries delivers an important message: according to economic specialization, degree 
of opening and the nature and history of social political demands, various mixes of flexicurity can 
be observed. Therefore, flex-flexicurity is almost an exception and hardly the rule. For many 
dimensions of labour, the maximum flexibility is not an optimum and, thus, a convenient degree 
of security is not detrimental to dynamic as well as static economic efficiency. 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: QUITE SPECIFIC CONDITIONS 
A priori, many structural conditions differ between developed and developing countries. 
Therefore, it is not a surprise if the configuration of flexicurity cannot be copied easily, even 
among closely linked European countries (Boyer, 2006). The major transformations of the world 
economy, however, as well as the paradigm shift of productive models associated with 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and, of course, domestic social demands, 
open up the possibility of some improvements which would reconcile employment creation and 
decent work. Some recent advances in development theories propose an interesting tool to assess 
what are the key factors that limit growth and employment: in some instances, the promotion of 
worker securities may simultaneously improve the welfare of the society and macroeconomic 
performance (Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco, 2005). Another crucial issue relates to the tools 
available to create, implement and monitor worker securities. The challenge might seem quite 
severe, but the good news is that some developing countries have been rather, or at least quite, 
successful in promoting elements of a decent work policy. 
Constraints and opportunities regarding productive employment 
and decent work 
 
The objectives of productive employment and decent work should be universally valid, but 
bearing in mind the specific features of different groups of countries their achievement calls for 
quite contrasted institutions, mechanisms and ways of achieving them (Ghai, 2002). Basically, if 
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the need to compete via product differentiation and innovation is an incentive to flexicurity in the 
context of high-employment rates in the formal sector, by contrast, most developing countries 
suffer from two structural obstacles to the diffusion of decent work and security. First, an 
impressive labour surplus leads to the domination of informality regarding, for example, the 
absence of labour contracts and the legal status of an activity, as well as the avoidance of taxes. It 
is especially so for the rural sector, which is largely associated with the domination of agriculture. 
Consequently, the implementation of ILO standards is highly problematic for developing 
countries which specialize in the production and export of primary commodities. 
 
Second, collective action in favour of workers security is made difficult because 
Governments and public administrations have neither the resources nor the ability or legitimacy 
to implement economy-wide labour standards. Similarly, workers unions are difficult to organize, 
or even do not exist in the informal sector. 
 
Furthermore, developing countries experience a larger macroeconomic volatility than 
industrialized economies, in the context of low-income levels that make insurance for workers 
difficult to finance. The pro-cyclicity of public budgets is another hindering factor. Paradoxically, 
financial globalization, which was supposed to help poor countries to alleviate economic 
downturns, seems, until now, to have had the opposite impact, i.e., it has created new sources of 
crises, especially for Asian countries. This has been quite detrimental because these crises have 
reduced long-term growth of poor countries (Cerra and Saxena, 2005). The number and severity 
of these constraints may suggest that the strategy proposed by ILO is hopeless for developing 
countries (table 2). Some (modest) countervailing forces are, however, pointed to in the literature. 
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Table 2  Obstacles and opportunities for decent work in developing countries 
 
1. Large, hidden obstacles to open 
employment; large informal sector 
• Frequently attributed to the excessive 
security granted to the formal sector 
2. Weak States • Social compact 
• Role of consumers of third- world 
products 
3. Weak/non-existing unions • Institution of representative unions by 
State regulation 
4. Low-income levels and resources for 
insurance 
• Human development:  a condition as well 
as an outcome of economic development 
5. Rural activity as structurally uncertain • Move from agriculture to services  
6. Large macroeconomic instability  • The smaller the economy, the likelier more 
flexibility, and significant welfare 
7. More uncertainty with the opening to the 
world economy 
• Globalization may be a trump:  
- Higher wages for multinationals 
- Higher wages in the export sector  
- Codes of conduct 
8. Rare public training • Shortage of skilled labour as an incentive 
for upgrading competences 
 
 
• It is at first difficult to consider that the relative security granted to the small number of 
workers employed in the formal sector is the reason for the lack of protection of informal 
workers. The argument may apply to OECD countries, where a large sector protected by 
labour laws is complemented by atypical labour contracts that bear most of the required 
flexibility in reaction to uncertainty. In developing countries, however, the ocean of flexibility 
of informal work is not the necessary complement of the rare islands of relative security: the 
high flexibility is the direct consequence of the productive structures, the nature of demand, 
and, eventually, the style for macroeconomic policy. The diversity of informal work has be 
recognized and carefully analysed (Chen, 2006), and the complex relations between the 
formal and informal sectors should be understood before addressing the issue with a strategy 
of progressive formalization of informal work. 
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● Given the pressures towards more flexibility even for previously protected workers, the 
distance between formal and informal employment could be reduced by progressive steps in 
granting some rights to informal workers, compatible with the employment decisions of 
entrepreneurs. The long-term goal could thus be to open a path in the direction of a single 
regime with qualified tolerance and minimum floors (Tokman, 2006). Symmetrically, a 
simplification of property titles and a form of de jure recognition of de facto property could 
help in fostering entrepreneurship, thus creating more wealth and alleviating poverty and 
insecurity (De Soto, 1986). In both cases, the recognition of rights may foster production and 
employment. 
 
• The low level of surplus available for accumulation is a strong incentive to allocate scarce 
resources to the more productive investments. The formation of human capital, in education 
and health, appears as a powerful lever in the promotion of development since it delivers 
more competences and life security (Todaro and Smith, 2005). This is, simultaneously, the 
input and the output of the process of development: quality of life and work security do 
evolve along with growth. 
 
• Per se, macroeconomic instability  either typically domestic or implied by the vagaries of the 
world economy  should be an incentive to search for mechanisms providing one form of 
security or another to people, and especially workers. This need is fulfilled, however, only if 
collective action allows for the design of the equivalent of insurance mechanisms: business 
associations, workers unions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil servants are 
required to discuss, negotiate and agree to build the various components of a welfare state. 
Actually, the more open the developed economies, the larger the spending on welfare, 
including active labour-market policies (see figure 6). This process took nearly a century, and 
is continuing in response to the structural changes of the last decades. It should not be a 
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surprise, therefore, if poor countries experience similar difficulties in building their welfare 
states in the epoch of trade liberalization, financial globalization and productive paradigm 
shifts. The organization of collective actors as well as the effectiveness and legitimacy of the 
State are among the discriminating variables. This might well be a convincing explanation 
why national trajectories differ so much between Africa (Nkurunziza, 2006) and Latin 
America (Pagès, 2003), or even within East Asia (Kwon, 2006). 
The ambiguous impact of globalization on labour standards 
 
The impact of the world economy on the perceived trade-off between employment and 
decent work is far more complex than the pro- and anti-globalization forces generally assess. It is 
simply because internationalization has many distinctive components, with contrasted impacts, 
and because national economies differ drastically in this respect (figure 8). 
 
• When trade opening contributes to the dynamism of a manufacturing export sector using 
modern technology, generally the welfare of the related workers is improved, South Korea 
being a good example (Kwon, 2006). When a rapid and general decrease in tariffs takes place, 
however, the destruction of manufacturing competences and high-wage jobs may correlate 
with a return to a quite regressive specialization in natural resources (Boyer and Neffa, 2004), 
with little job creation.  This results in a large widening of inequalities (Waisgrais, 2002) and 
the diffusion of work insecurity across a large section of the population, as was the case in 
Argentina. 
 
• It is now widely recognized that trade and financial openings are not equivalent (Prasad and 
others, 2004): on average, trade enhances welfare, whereas opening to finance has not such a 
positive effect, and provokes an increase in the probability of financial crises. Since growth 
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rate is reduced after such episodes, the global impact, until now at least, has frequently been 
detrimental to work security. 
Figure 8  Chances and constraints on productive employment and decent work 
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• The opening of capital accounts may have quite contrasted outcomes. In theory, Foreign 
Direct Investments (FDI) develop domestic productive capacities, and frequently contribute 
to export. Some empirical studies suggest that the conventional wisdom that foreign 
investors favour countries with low labour standards is not confirmed (Kucera, 2001). 
Actually the degree of workers rights may go along with political and social stability and 
human capital development. By contrast, portfolio investment brings frequently brusque and 
unwarranted inflows that distort the terms of trade and the productive structures in favour of 
the sector producing non-tradable goods. The related boom ultimately ends by a sudden stop 
of capital inflow (Kalantzis, 2006). In developing countries, this means a severe recession and, 
frequently, political programmes that promote labour flexibility. The final outcome is a 
growth slowdown, and more insecurity in labour contracts for a large part of the population. 
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An optimistic view could consider that if the sequencing of the opening were correct  
trade, foreign investment, portfolio investment  globalization could help promote some labour 
standards (Ghose, 2003: 95-109), while contributing to productive employment. 
Employment diagnosis: A method for drawing a dividing line 
between flexibility and security 
 
Quite rightly, the UN/DESA Development Forum on Productive Employment and 
Decent Work stressed that productive employment was the primary component of any pro-
labour policy. This paper has tried to show that the maximum flexibility is generally far from the 
optimum in terms of economic efficiency. The issue is then to determine what should be the 
most convenient flexibility/security mix compatible with the objective of job creation. The 
answer cannot be derived from pure theory, since the precise structural conditions have to be 
analysed in each national, regional or local context. In a sense, this is a drastic reversal with 
respect to the legacy of the so-called Washington Consensus, according to which the same 
general menu was supposed to fit all domestic contexts. 
 
The question is whether the relevant tools are available to make such an analysis. The long 
experience of development economics has recently provided quite an interesting and stimulating 
method to cope with the diversity of developing as well as developed countries. The growth 
diagnostics approach (Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco, 2005) proposes systematic review of the 
multipliers associated with the relaxation of the various constraints inhibiting economic activity 
and the design of economic policy and reform of economic institutions, accordingly. In some 
instances, a policy that delivers quite impressive results in one country may be inefficient or, 
worse, detrimental to growth in another. For instance, the authors find that a sound 
macroeconomic policy is far from being a sufficient condition for growth since the long-term 
trajectory is shaped by factors quite different from those that would shape the short-term 
equilibrium. In other words, static efficiency  frequently associated with price flexibility  has to 
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be distinguished from dynamic efficiency, i.e., the ability to improve, cumulatively, productivity 
and the standards of living of an entire population. 
 
 It might be useful to rejuvenate a macroeconomic theory that was quite enlightening in the 
1980s in order to propose an analytical framework that would transcend the opposition between 
Keynesian and neoclassical conceptions of the determinants of employment (Benassy, 1982). 
Actually the so-called disequilibrium theory exhibits a series of determinants of employment. 
Unemployment is Keynesian if the limiting factor is effective demand; classical if low profitability 
limits hiring; and Marxist if the scarcity of productive capacity is the origin of low employment. 
When applied to developing countries and to the analysis of the links between employment and 
various forms of workers security, this framework delivers three major lessons (figure 9). 
 
• In many cases, the issue of labour-market institutional reform might be irrelevant, since the 
disequilibrium originates from totally different factors: an overvaluation of the domestic 
currency, an excessively high interest rate due to the lack of credibility of economic policy or 
bad management of firms, etc.  In such a context, the search for wage flexibility, for example, 
may deliver second-order results, since this is not the relevant constraint on growth. Too 
often, in the 1990s, financial disequilibria have triggered excessive downgrading of workers 
security in terms of wages, work intensity, welfare, etc. 
 
• In some instances, employment levels can increase by strengthening precise forms of 
workers security. For instance, if unemployment is Keynesian, more income security for 
workers has a positive impact both on employment and profit rate. Similarly, when firms are 
limited by a scarcity of skills, a policy developing workers competences simultaneously  
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Figure 9  A growth diagnostics approach to employment creation 
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• improves macroeconomic performance and promotes welfare, and possibly reduces income 
inequality. In this case, there is a complementarity between employment levels and the form 
of worker security. Nevertheless, this is not necessarily the case, and the mix between 
flexibility and security has to be tuned to the precise local situation at a given historical 
period. 
 
Within a third configuration, labour flexibility might be required to increase productive 
employment if, for instance, classical unemployment is the main source of macroeconomic 
disequilibria. Alternatively, some collective agreements can codify automatic indexation to 
inflation and productivity, and this configuration might appear unable to react effectively to new 
macroeconomic shocks. This case was quite frequent in the 1970s and 1980s, but nowadays the 
majority of developing countries are suffering from the opposite disequilibrium: productivity 
increases mainly feed profit increases and relative prices decline, but wages increase only 
marginally. The likelihood of this third configuration is now quite small in most developing 
countries. 
 
Consequently, each country has to find is own mix between security and flexibility. At this 
level of generality, there are configurations that fulfill the same objective as the flexicurity model, 
but with totally different institutional settings, since productive structures, social values and 
political choices differ significantly from one country to another. Even within the same national 
economy, the coexistence of defensive flexibility can be observed in some clusters -- i.e., via wage 
reduction and work-intensity increase --  along with offensive flexibility in others, where the 
building of individual and collective competence is the main answer to technical change and the 
evolution of world competition (Vijayabaskar, 2005). 
 31
What are the best methods for promoting decent work? 
A brief retrospective analysis of contemporary developed countries suggests that the high 
security levels have been reached by a long-term historical process. The very unfolding of 
industrialization, sometimes called modernization, triggered large social transformations that 
generated new forms of insecurity (industrial injuries, unstable employment, obsolescence of 
traditional skills, and volatility of income). Workers were hurt by these structural changes and 
have thus voiced social demands in favour of mechanisms restoring a form of security. Similarly, 
major economic and financial crises, as well as world wars, have strengthened the bargaining 
power of workers and in a position to express strong demands for protection from States and 
Governments. As a consequence, rights to security have been embedded simultaneously into 
labour laws passed by Governments and into collective agreements negotiated between business 
associations and workers unions. In spite of some social deregulation, developed countries 
continue to exhibit high levels of workers security  (table 4). 
 
As previously mentioned, few developing countries actually experience such a process of 
industrialization, with the noticeable exceptions of China and India. Therefore, most developing 
countries have to follow other paths in the direction of better worker security (table 3). 
 
• International organizations, especially ILO, are in charge of designing and diffusing some 
basic labour standards via the use of international conventions. This process is quite useful in 
analyzing the diversity of national experiences and creating a community in charge of 
diffusing these international norms. Nevertheless, national Governments may or may not 
sign these conventions. Even when these conventions exist, their implementation is entirely 
left to the initiative and interest of national Governments. These international pressures 
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become more effective when they are taken up by groups of domestic actors who ask for the 
explicit recognition of these international labour norms. 
 
• Given the key role of transnational corporations, it would seem that it would be in their  
long-term interests to cope with a decent approach to labour management all over the world. 
If their consumers are ready to pay a premium in order to be sure that ethical norms are 
respected when production is delocalized all over the world, such an equilibrium may be    
self-fulfilling. Nevertheless, it is not sure that such a virtuous circle  the consumers of the 
developed world disciplining the multinationals  can be generalized and that it is strong 
enough to replace the role of hard law in Western countries (Levis, 2006; Lobel, 2006). 
 
• Non-governmental organizations could complement the two previous mechanisms. First, 
they can report to the international organizations the degree of fulfillment of international 
labour norms and thus help to enforce them by blaming and shaming. Second, they can 
organize discussions and bargain with transnational corporations, and they are well equipped 
to do so since most NGOs are transnational too. The difficulty is that a plurality of NGOs, 
with different and sometimes contradictory objectives, cannot replace the centrality of 
national governance and cannot be a substitute for a true power of coercion, the power of a 
unified, but non-existing, world government. 
Table 3  The paths to workers security 
WHAT CONDITIONS WOULD FAVOUR DECENT WORK? 
• Business codes  ● Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
• National labour law ● Scarcity of workers 
• Collective voice of workers ● Full employment 
• Social conflicts  
• Social compacts  
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The mobilization of domestic actors is therefore crucial, since business codes, corporate 
social accountability, social compacts are only partial substitutes for the process generated by 
hard law, as observed in old, industrialized countries. 
Some developing countries do succeed 
In the light of the previous arguments, it will come as no surprise that the global index of 
economic security, elaborated by the ILO Socio-economic Security Programme, shows that the 
majority of best performers do belong to OECD (table 4). The only exceptions are four Eastern 
and Central European countries; this can be interpreted as a legacy of the order, inherited from 
the Soviet-type regime, where the State was warranting strong security to workers in exchange for 
compliance with political authorities. 
 
No developing countries are part of the group of pacesetters, but Mauritius, South Africa, 
Costa Rica and Chile, as well as Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia, belong to this group: in terms of 
outcomes these countries are quite successful in spite of a poor score on inputs and processes 
governing worker security. 
 
The majority of other countries belong to a fourth group, characterized by less effective 
security and low institutional mechanisms to obtain it. Most African countries are part of this 
group, as well as some Latin American countries. China and India are present in this group too, 
and this is an important finding: per se high growth is not sufficient to promote worker security. 
Nevertheless, growth generates many imbalances and social unrest that implicitly at least raise the 
issue of the implementation of decent work.  
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Table 4  Some developing countries are quite successful in enhancing security 
  
High score on Outcome    
 
High score on Input Process  Low score on Input Process  
 
Pacesetters    Pragmatists   
Regions  Countries    Countries   
Africa and Middle East  Israel    Mauritius  South Africa  
Americas  Canada    Barbados  Chile  
    
Costa Rica  United States 
Asia  Japan    Australia  New Zealand  
    
South Korea   
Eastern Europe  Bulgaria  Latvia  Estonia  Slovakia  
and Central Asia  Czech Republic    Lithuania   
 
Hungary      
Western Europe  Austria  Luxembourg    
 
Belgium  Netherlands    
 
Denmark  Norway    
 
Finland  Portugal    
 
France  Spain    
 
Germany  Sweden    
 
Greece  Switzerland    
 
Ireland  United Kingdom    
 
Italy    
  
Low score on Outcome    
 
High score on Input Process  Low score on Input Process  
 
Conventionals    Much-to-be-done   
Regions  Countries    Countries   
Africa and Middle East  Burkina Faso    Algeria  Mauritania  
 
Congo    Benin  Morocco  
    
Burundi  Nigeria  
    
Congo, Democratic  Rwanda  
    
  Republic  of  
    
Côte d'Ivoire  Senegal  
    
Egypt  Sierra Leone  
    
Ethiopia  Tunisia  
    
Ghana  Turkey  
    
Lebanon  Zimbabwe  
    
Madagascar   
Americas  Argentina  Panama  Colombia  Mexico  
 
Brazil    Honduras  Peru  
 
Ecuador     
Venezuela 
(Bolivarian 
Republic of)  
Asia  Philippines    Bangladesh  Nepal  
    
China  Pakistan  
    
India  Sri Lanka  
    
Indonesia  Thailand  
Eastern Europe  Azerbaijan  Russian Federation  Albania  Kyrgyzstan  
and Central Asia  Belarus  Tajikistan  Armenia  Romania  
 
Croatia    Georgia  Turkmenistan  
 
Moldova, Republic of  Kazakhstan  Ukraine  
     
Uzbekistan  
Western Europe       
Source: IFP-SES database 2004.       
Source: ILO (2004b), p. 277.  
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CONCLUSION  
This paper has tentatively challenged the conventional wisdom that the dynamism of 
employment is always contradictory to the enforcement of some forms of security for workers. 
Three major arguments can be mobilized. 
 
1. Contemporary theorizing has drastically changed, and economists now recognize the 
specificity of the wage-labour nexus, by contrast with typical market relations. Consequently, 
minimum security is required for good economic performance by firms and national 
economies. Other social sciences do stress the ethical and moral values associated with 
labour, and thus provide strong justifications for the implementation of basic securities for 
individuals. 
 
2. A comparative analysis of OECD countries shows that the extended security promoted by 
welfare systems has not been detrimental to growth, innovation and job creation.  On the 
contrary, small, open social democratic economies display a clear complementarity between 
security and economic performance, equity and dynamic efficiency. The need for inclusive 
welfare is clearly perceived by some fast-growing Asian countries, such as South Korea and 
China.  
 
3. Developing countries cannot immediately catch up with the emerging standards of flexicurity 
but, quite pragmatically, they should look for the forms of worker security that are 
compatible with sustainable development. A priori, many different configurations might     
coexist in response to economic specialization, social values and political choices. 
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 The epoch of the Washington Consensus is fading away and the idea that the same size fits 
all is probably over. These are clear incentives for a new generation of research, and for 
innovative policies to sustain the current hope and strategy that has recently emerged in Latin 
America: growth with equity.  
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